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A sample from the conclusions of the recent EU summit:
In addition, until 31 March 2017, if members of the Council representing at least 75% of the population or at least 75% of the number of Member States necessary to constitute a blocking minority as provided in Article [I-25(2)] indicate their opposition to the Council adopting an act by a qualified majority, the mechanism provided for in the draft Decision contained in Declaration nș 5 annexed to the Final Act of the 2004 IGC [shall apply]. As from 1 April 2017, the same mechanism will apply, the relevant percentages being, respectively, at least 55% of the population or at least 55% of the number of Member States necessary to constitute a blocking minority as provided in Article [I-25(2)].There's 15 pages more of Annex 1 on similar lines. I especially like:
In III-275(3) only: "The specific procedure provided in the second and third subparagraphs shall not apply to acts which constitute a development of the Schengen acquis."Your eyes glaze over? You hadn't realized that "acquis", without italics, is a word of the English language as spoken in Brussels? That's the point.
Angela Merkel may act and look like Mrs Doubtfire but she's a redoubtable politician. The adversaries she leaves stranded in her wake wonder quite what happened to them. Remember the proposed Constitution for Europe, released by Giscard d'Estaing with great fanfare in July 2003, and adopted as a treaty (sections, complete) in December 2004? The one subsequently binned by the French and traditionally Europhile Dutch in referenda? It's back again from the dead, thanks to the magic of Dr. Merkelstein. Hence my title, also a nod to the vampiric survival powers of the appalling Common Agricultural Policy.
The Brussels meeting agreed to hold an intergovernmental conference this year to approve a reform treaty. To approve, not negotiate; the governments could send the office cleaners so long as they can sign on the dotted lines. The treaty could be rejected by national parliaments, but that's it.
The French and Dutch referenda could be interpreted several ways. Their voters:
Explanation (1) seems unlikely to me, but the Brussels equivalent of the Beltway crowd have settled on it, at least for public consumption. So the recent agreement strips out all references to "constitution", "laws", and the European "foreign minister." But it leaves all the substance of the Constitution, bar recent tweaks:
As far as the content of the amendments to the existing Treaties is concerned, the innovations resulting from the 2004 IGC will be integrated into the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, as specified in this mandate.The existing supremacy of EU over national legislation is also reaffirmed. So the Reform Treaty will be a purely cosmetic removal of Giscard's cosmetic rewrite, like stone-washing of Levis or the aerosol mud sold to London yuppies to spray on the wheels of their garaged SUVs for Monday morning.
The real beauty of Merkel's plan is the way it deals with the probable reason for the referendum noes, (3). The defect of Giscard's draft was that it was comprehensible. The latest plan is, following longstanding practice, written in opaque bafflegab; the peasants may grumble, but they can't follow it enough to revolt.
Consider the basic structure of the treaties. At present you have:
The complexity isn't just a matter of bad drafting. It follows from Jean Monnets's Big Idea, a complete delegation from states of executive (and later legislative) powers in precisely defined fields, as opposed to the traditional intergovernmental approach of broad objectives and a defined process but few initial powers. The machine was designed to accumulate new competences; and as it does so, different procedures are introduced to reflect the political compromises of the time. This confusing pattern has been left intact; a serious defect in that democratic accountability through the European Parliament is far less on crime and security policy than in economic matters.
Eurosceptics should be more frightened of Merkel's treaty than the Constitution. For by its name, it marked a move away from Monnets' messianic pragmatism toward a stable Madisonian federalism. It would have been very difficult to change. The Reform Treaty is just another technical amending treaty, like Maastricht and Nice, and doesn't mark any endpoint. The EU will go on merrily accumulating powers.
The human rights provisions are weird. Up to now, there's been an odd arrangement by which the continent's human rights instrument, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) , with a decent list of justiciable civil rights and an unwieldy but professional Court, has operated since 1949 entirely outside the EU. It's run by the intergovernmental Council of Europe in Strasbourg, my former employer. The EU is jealous and as part of the constitution exercise drafted its own Charter including social rights like the right to a decent environment and social security. The Council of Europe has tried for years to head this off by pushing the idea of the EU becoming a party to the ECHR.
To deal with the problem, the Brussels summit has:
It looks to me as if the the Brussels summit has managed to change a system that was more or less comprehensible to the citizen into a rococo maze for the citizen and a truffle bed for lawyers.